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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2445 
___________ 
 
CHRISLER DAJUSTE, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A047-353-200) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 4, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Chrisler Dajuste petitions for review of a final order of removal.  For the following 
reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
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 Dajuste, a native and citizen of Haiti, was admitted to the United States in 1999 on 
an immigrant visa.  In 2008, he pleaded guilty in a Pennsylvania state court to possession 
with intent to deliver cocaine.  Dajuste was subsequently charged as removable for 
having committed an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  An 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him removable as charged in 2009.  In response to an 
allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the proceedings were reopened in 2011 
and Dajuste applied for asylum and related relief.  He claimed that he had been harmed 
by the Tonton Macoutes before leaving Haiti in 1999 and that he feared he would be 
imprisoned and tortured on account of his past political activity if he returned to Haiti. 
 Because Dajuste’s conviction was for a drug trafficking offense and a “particularly 
serious crime,” the IJ concluded that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of 
removal.  The IJ denied the only relief available to Dajuste, deferral of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture, on the basis of lack of credibility.  The BIA upheld the IJ’s 
decision.  In addition, the BIA rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
on appeal because Dajuste had failed to satisfy procedural prerequisites.  The BIA also 
rejected a claim that Dajuste’s due process rights were violated by the IJ’s unspecified 
abuse of discretion, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion and that Dajuste was 
afforded a full and fair hearing.  This petition for review followed. 
  Although we generally lack jurisdiction to review final orders of removal issued 
against aliens who, like Dajuste, are removable for having been convicted of an 
aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), we retain jurisdiction to review 
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constitutional claims or questions of law, see id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Our jurisdiction in 
this regard is limited to colorable claims.  See Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Although a claim need not ultimately be meritorious to be deemed colorable, 
“a party may not dress up a claim with legal clothing to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction.”  
Id. at 187. 
   In this case, Dajuste has not presented any colorable constitutional or legal claims.  
Although he mentions due process and the alleged failure to apply the correct law, most 
of his claims are essentially challenges to the IJ’s findings regarding credibility, the lack 
of corroborating evidence, and the weight of the evidence.  These are factual 
determinations.  See, e.g., Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2005).  To the extent that Dajuste 
claims that his counsel was ineffective when he asserts that the proceedings were 
“tainted” by counsel, this unsupported accusation is not a colorable claim because it 
amounts to nothing more than a “bald-faced allegation[].”  See United States v. Voigt, 89 
F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996).  Finally, to the extent that Dajuste makes a due process 
claim by complaining about the fact that the IJ questioned him at his hearing, the claim is 
not colorable.  Dajuste does not identify what, if anything, was improper about the 
questioning.  This insubstantial and frivolous claim does not provide a basis for 
jurisdiction.  See Pareja, 615 F.3d at 187. 
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 In sum, because Dajuste has failed to raise any colorable constitutional or legal 
claims, we lack jurisdiction over his petition for review.  Accordingly, we grant the 
Government’s motion and will dismiss the petition. 
